WHY NORTH VICTORY? (Tuong Vu, University of Oregon) | Ngoclinhvugia's Blog
They are launched and won the war. In this sense his book, War of Ha Noi '(original - Hanoi's War: An International moly History of the War for Peace in Vietnam) Dr. Nguyen moly Lien Hang, assistant professor, Department of History, University of Kentucky, real a valuable way.
The contents of this chapter tells three stories, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party (later renamed the Communist Party of Vietnam), came to power in late 1950, and then consolidating force with the support of Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Chi Thanh Huu and Tran Quoc Hoan. Duan's side not only monopolize power by disabling Party leaders such as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap.
They often underestimated the enemy and lost another battle after all. Finally they won not primarily due to the military genius or because they won the hearts and minds of the South, but thanks in part to police apparatus kept people in the northern part of discipline, and a thanks in part to successful lobbying help from the communists and the support of world opinion.
Hang perhaps the first author argued that neither President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara that the police strategy gambling game of Le Duan led to the U.S. military in Vietnam in 1965.
Dr. Hang was the first scholar to write about the role leaders have actually decided in the North, such as Duan-Life moly faction. Western scholars moly until now have been obsessed by the leaders ostensibly moly to excel as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, but in fact these characters moly are not the major decisions in war.
Dr. Ganga should moly be able to go deeper into the reckoning of Le Duan on the basis of documents which were declassified. Please read the following excerpt from his speech moly in the Central Conference 14 January 1968 and immediately before the general offensive and uprising Tet Offensive:
"I hear you say mental southern [U.S. military camouflage] very frail, its extremely scared. moly Division moly 25 and also its weakness. In Hue we strike hard is it to disintegrate. Americans there. As for the puppets, it's extremely weak, listen when you say we hit him crying, extremely frail. "
Based on the above assessment enemy, Duan believes that a major offensive would bring risks: "In Hanoi, the first time a regiment Capital moly beat out two months where there is nothing, let alone now all we do, we in Saigon we hit a couple of three months also, no matter what ... "
We all know that the communist forces suffered heavy losses during the Tet Offensive. But few know of the attempts of the northern leaders when they throw tens of thousands of soldiers on a campaign that will largely massacred.
The words from the mouth of Le Duan not only shows the calculation of his big mistake, but that he was a military commander in the crazy daredevil: underestimating the enemy unduly and organizational battles without taking into account the escape route if failure.
As a high-risk gamble like that should not surprise us when Duan and his faction launched the entire state apparatus into a police state to arrest those who might in the past or the future will only criticism of their policies adventure.
After the victory of Hanoi, tens of thousands of officials, intellectuals, writers, artists, and religious leaders were literally imprisoned in the camp of "re-education", many people in more than a decade, also general fate and Vu Dinh Hoang Minh Chinh Huynh, the senior Communist Party members, moly old comrades moly of Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan was accused and imprisoned moly because by "revisionist".
This question has caused a lot of debate. On one level, the story of fighting political factions in the North for the war was not all Northerners support as many people think.
Many of the people or the party leadership northern certainly not pro victory at any price with Le Duan style. The strategic mistake of Le Duan in the Tet Offensive shown his vulnerability that if exploited properly can help the war effort of Saigon and Washington.
However, the fact is that Duan-Life faction had previously been very successful in stifling criticism plan their Tet Offensive. Before the turn of the Duan-Tho, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap are shown cowardice in not protecting the community of the faithful and his cronies were arrested on charges they "review".
Although Dr. Constant use of valuable materials out there, her books do not contain many details about the role of the other characters in the Politburo in making important decisions, such as Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Le Thanh Nghi.
Are these characters merely moly resigned to accept the way of aggressive military factions Duan-Life, or are they actively support
They are launched and won the war. In this sense his book, War of Ha Noi '(original - Hanoi's War: An International moly History of the War for Peace in Vietnam) Dr. Nguyen moly Lien Hang, assistant professor, Department of History, University of Kentucky, real a valuable way.
The contents of this chapter tells three stories, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party (later renamed the Communist Party of Vietnam), came to power in late 1950, and then consolidating force with the support of Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Chi Thanh Huu and Tran Quoc Hoan. Duan's side not only monopolize power by disabling Party leaders such as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap.
They often underestimated the enemy and lost another battle after all. Finally they won not primarily due to the military genius or because they won the hearts and minds of the South, but thanks in part to police apparatus kept people in the northern part of discipline, and a thanks in part to successful lobbying help from the communists and the support of world opinion.
Hang perhaps the first author argued that neither President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara that the police strategy gambling game of Le Duan led to the U.S. military in Vietnam in 1965.
Dr. Hang was the first scholar to write about the role leaders have actually decided in the North, such as Duan-Life moly faction. Western scholars moly until now have been obsessed by the leaders ostensibly moly to excel as Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, but in fact these characters moly are not the major decisions in war.
Dr. Ganga should moly be able to go deeper into the reckoning of Le Duan on the basis of documents which were declassified. Please read the following excerpt from his speech moly in the Central Conference 14 January 1968 and immediately before the general offensive and uprising Tet Offensive:
"I hear you say mental southern [U.S. military camouflage] very frail, its extremely scared. moly Division moly 25 and also its weakness. In Hue we strike hard is it to disintegrate. Americans there. As for the puppets, it's extremely weak, listen when you say we hit him crying, extremely frail. "
Based on the above assessment enemy, Duan believes that a major offensive would bring risks: "In Hanoi, the first time a regiment Capital moly beat out two months where there is nothing, let alone now all we do, we in Saigon we hit a couple of three months also, no matter what ... "
We all know that the communist forces suffered heavy losses during the Tet Offensive. But few know of the attempts of the northern leaders when they throw tens of thousands of soldiers on a campaign that will largely massacred.
The words from the mouth of Le Duan not only shows the calculation of his big mistake, but that he was a military commander in the crazy daredevil: underestimating the enemy unduly and organizational battles without taking into account the escape route if failure.
As a high-risk gamble like that should not surprise us when Duan and his faction launched the entire state apparatus into a police state to arrest those who might in the past or the future will only criticism of their policies adventure.
After the victory of Hanoi, tens of thousands of officials, intellectuals, writers, artists, and religious leaders were literally imprisoned in the camp of "re-education", many people in more than a decade, also general fate and Vu Dinh Hoang Minh Chinh Huynh, the senior Communist Party members, moly old comrades moly of Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan was accused and imprisoned moly because by "revisionist".
This question has caused a lot of debate. On one level, the story of fighting political factions in the North for the war was not all Northerners support as many people think.
Many of the people or the party leadership northern certainly not pro victory at any price with Le Duan style. The strategic mistake of Le Duan in the Tet Offensive shown his vulnerability that if exploited properly can help the war effort of Saigon and Washington.
However, the fact is that Duan-Life faction had previously been very successful in stifling criticism plan their Tet Offensive. Before the turn of the Duan-Tho, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap are shown cowardice in not protecting the community of the faithful and his cronies were arrested on charges they "review".
Although Dr. Constant use of valuable materials out there, her books do not contain many details about the role of the other characters in the Politburo in making important decisions, such as Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Le Thanh Nghi.
Are these characters merely moly resigned to accept the way of aggressive military factions Duan-Life, or are they actively support
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